The spirit of Contribution in Christian Mysticism and Japanese Buddhism

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1) A contradiction

At first sight, and according to popular conceptions, mysticism - be it Eastern or Western - seems a highly unlikely candidate when looking for manifestations of the spirit of contribution. Mysticism may be defined by the double conviction that there is a perfect reality behind the apparent multiplicity, divergence, and conflict encountered through normal human experience, and that the one goal of human life should be to achieve one-ness with that reality. (Steineck 2000, 272:17-27)

Negating all ties to the secular world, including one's fellow human beings, seems to be the first and fundamental step in the search for union with the envisioned perfect reality. Wouldn't we therefore expect the mystic sage to dwell in a lonely and quiet place, to keep him- or herself aloof from the pains and pleasures of the world? Wouldn't she or he rather abhor involvement with social issues, scientific endeavors, or the refined entertainment of the arts?

The classical modern theory of religion has done much to entrench such a view. Max Weber famously juxtaposed mystic world-negation with the inner-worldly asceticism of protestant religion. According to his analysis, mysticism is the prototype of “radical renunciation of the world”. To the mystic “every action within the world must appear as a danger to the utterly irrational and extramundane state of salvation.”

(Karl Jaspers in his Psychology of World-Views identified the ideal state of the mystic as life in mystical trance, which can only be described metaphorically as a state of complete calm and satisfaction within timeless being, a life without any drives, sublated in the constant presence of god - or how else the experience of being unified may be formulated.

(The German philosopher Heinrich Rickert even characterized mysticism as the “ultimate point of the contemplative, impersonal, asocial line”

Throughout the paper, all translations from non-English sources are by the author, except where stated otherwise.)

1 German in the original: “[...] das Handeln, in der Welt mithin als Gefährdung der durchaus irrationalen und ausserweltlichen Heilszuständlichkeit erscheinen muss.”

2 German in the original: “[...] und dem Leben in mystischer Versenkung, das nur gleichnisweise zu beschreiben ist als volle Ruhe und Befriedigung im zeitlos Seienden, das ohne Drang besteht, das in der steten Gegenwart Gottes, oder wie das Einssein nun formuliert werden mag, aufgehoben ist.”

3 German in the original: “[...] als Abschluss der kontemplativen, unpersönlichen,
faith. (Rickert 1921, 400) Since Hegel described Buddhism as the "religion of being-in-itself" ("die Religion des Insichseins") (Hegel 1959, I, 374-390), such judgments have been extended without much questioning to this religion as a whole, which is often perceived as the prototype of a mystical religion. Hegel's description of the goals of Buddhist practice come down to pretty much the same as Weber's and Jaspers' remarks on mysticism: the noisy voices of worldly life have to subside; the silence of the grave is the element of eternity and sanctity. Bliss consists in the cessation of all movement of body and soul, in the annihilation of oneself, and once man has reached this stage of perfection, there is no more change, the soul is freed from wandering the world, and he is identical with the god Fo (=Buddha).

These classical modern conceptions have retained some popularity, at least among non-specialists. This may be in part because they are easy to support by textual evidence. All mystical positions, Christian or Buddhist, emphatically negate the value of ordinary human life and its values. Eckhart says: Whatever of the soul is in this world or looks into this world, whatever is attached to her and looks out, that she should hate (Walshe 1991, 1:172-173)

In a similar vein, the Chinese Chan (Zen) master Huangbo states: The building up of good and evil both involve attachment to form. Those who, being attached to form, do evil, have to undergo various incarnations unnecessarily; while those who, being attached to form, do good, subject themselves to toil and privation equally to no purpose.

If we were to stick only to such sayings, and to the conceptualization of mysticism as a world-denying quietism derived from them, it would seem impossible to trace any signs of a spirit of contribution in mystic asozialen Reihe...

Die lauten Stimmen weltlichen Lebens müssen verstummen; das Schweigen des Grabes ist das Element der EWigkeit und Heiligkeit. In dem Aufhören aller Bewegung, Regung des Körpers, aller Bewegung der Seele, in dieser Vernichtung seiner selbst, darin besteht das Glück, und wenn der Mensch zu dieser Stufe der Vollkommenheit gekommen ist, so ist keine Abwechslung mehr, seine Seele hat keine Wanderung mehr zu befürchten, denn er ist identisch mit dem Gott Fo. (Hegel 1959, I, 389)

But even Kurt Flasch, one of the greatest authorities on Medieval philosophy, seems to subscribe to such a concept of mysticism when he attempts to "save Eckhart from the mystical stream". (Flasch 1988)

religion. However, in spite of the popularity of such notions of mystic quietism, there has also been a host of research on Christian and Buddhist mysticism giving evidence to the contrary. Biographical research on the life of the Christian mystics has demonstrated that the most exemplary among them, like Eckhart or Cusanus, were both scholars and clerics actively involved in the affairs of the church. (Ruh 1985; Flasch 1998) Mutatis mutandis, the same may be said about exemplary Buddhist mystics. In Japan, one might think of the likes of Gyōki Bosatsu, Kūkai, or Ninshō, to name but a few. (Inoue 1966; Augustine 2001; Abe 1999; Matsuo 2004; Goodwin 1989) There seems to be a blatant contradiction between those popular and impressive sayings of the mystics that talk about the necessity of leaving worldly attachments and involvements behind, and their personal and institutional practice, which includes active contributions to human and social life, in terms of politics, charity, and artistic creation.

In the following, I will attempt to resolve that seeming contradiction by exploring mystical doctrine in some depth. I will demonstrate that at the core of the mystical understanding of reality, there is an element of "goodness" or "abundance" that provokes an urge to give, to contribute, in the mystic who has attained unity with perfect reality. I shall firstly draw on the example of Meister Eckhart to explore the relationship between "being" and "goodness" in his metaphysics. Secondly, I will analyze the philosophical writings of Kūkai to describe how his conception of perfect reality as the dharma-body of Vairocana Buddha leads him to an affirmative attitude towards symbolic expression.

2) Being, nothingness, and goodness in Meister Eckhart

Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) is often treated as the epitome of Christian mysticism, and has served as the primum comparationis in various studies relating Western and Eastern mysticism. (Ueda 1983a; Ueda 1983b; Otto and Mensching 1971) However, one should remember that in his case, the honorific "Meister", which in such a context invites associations to the proverbial masters of Zen Buddhism, is in fact derived from the German rendering of his academic title, designating the position of magister (i.e., professor) at the prestigious university of Paris he held twice, 1302-1303 and 1311-1313 (Ruh 1985, 18-21). Eckhart, in other words, in spite of everything we might expect from a mystic, was a renowned academic in his time. In his Latin works he provides for a systematical exposition of his doctrine, while in his more famous sermons in the Middle High German vernacular, he expounds his teachings in a less technical and more "existential" language, full of suggestive metaphors and similes. (Eckhart 1987; Eckhart 1979)

A core piece of Eckhart's philosophy that concerns us here is his doctrine of the unity of the so-called transcendentalia (transcendental notions).
In medieval Christian philosophy, the four notions of being (esse), unity (unitas), truth (veritas), and goodness (bonitas) were considered to be the highest, associated with God himself—although the exact nature of the relation between them and God was a subject of debate. Eckhart's version of this seminal part of Christian metaphysics is characterized by two equally bold statements: firstly, Eckhart identifies the predicates with God, as stated in the first sentence of the “Prologue to the work of propositions” (Prologus in opus propositionum): “Esse deus est” (“Being is God”). (Eckhart 1936a, 166) Secondly, he posits the unity and convertibility of all transcendentalia. These two statements have important consequences for our subject, and it is worthwhile to explore them in some detail.

When Eckhart identifies being with God, he is careful to formulate this in a way that puts God in the position of the predicate, and not the subject. By this, he means to imply that there is not a transitive relation between God and being. Being is defined by God, while God is not defined by, that is, not restricted to, being (or unity, or truth, or goodness). (Mojsisch 1983, 44) The meaning of being etc. therefore is not to be learned from the ordinary, finite things to be found in the world, since they do not possess these characteristics in themselves. Eckhart succinctly states that “only God is in the proper sense being, one, true, and good” (…solus deus proprie est ens, unum, verum et bonum). (Eckhart 1936a, 167) That, in turn, means that God is not only the ratio sciendi, the foundation of all possible knowledge of being, unity, truth, and goodness, but also their ratio essendi, the reason why they exist. At first sight, this may not be a surprising statement for a Christian philosopher, since God in Christian religion is seen as the creator of everything that exists. But in Eckhart's version of this doctrine, God does not, at some point in time, give existence to the world as a whole, or to each of its creatures, in such a manner that after the creation, the created would exist on its own. His comments on the book of Genesis are most informative in this respect. Drawing on the Latin version of the Bible that was authoritative in his day, Eckhart makes much of the formulation that God created the world “in the beginning” - and not “at the beginning”. (Eckhart 1936c, 190) In one of his sermons in the vernacular, he further explains that the “beginning” (principium) is “the first simple now of eternity” (-est primum nunc simplex aeternitatis), and not some point in, or even the beginning of time. (Eckhart 1936d, DW I: 143-144) This is a necessary condition for the continued existence of the created, because the created never “is” in a finite sense. Because of this, it is significant that it does not say that God created at the beginning, but in beginning” (Propter quod significanter non ait a principio, sed in principio deum creasse). (Eckhart 1936b, 162)
its own right. It needs to be constantly supported by the one and only
being that truly is, that is, god. In other words, it needs to be
constantly created. And that is precisely because it does not have the
properties of being, unity, etc., but possesses these predicates only
in an analogical sense.

The analogy that is posited here between the being of god and the being
of man, between the truth, unity, or goodness of god and the finite truth,
unity, or goodness of any creature, has a precise and specific technical
meaning. Bernhard Mojsisch in his monograph on the subject characterizes
it by six points, four of which (no. 1, 4, 6 and 5 in Mojsisch's count)
are important here:

1. The analogy is drawn between the first and the second term with respect
to a property that is possessed only by the first term; the first term
is what the analogy is about.
2. The second term of the analogy is related to the first term because
the object that is described through the analogy thinks of the second
term as mediating the property in question, i.e. man thinks that he
possesses finite being, through which he is related to the being of god.
However, the second term (finite being), if seen from the point of view
of the first term, is nothing other than the first term, mediating itself
with itself: God does not create something like finite being, he is -
and by that, everything else exists.
3. The second term of the analogy therefore has only a provisional
meaning; it is only that finite creatures believe that they "have" the
second term of the analogy (i.e., finite being and the like), because
they do not reflect on the self-mediation of the first term, i.e., true
being, which is the one and only true ground of their being.
4. What is described through the second term (i.e. the finite, individual
creature) is nothing in itself and of itself. (Mojsisch 1983, 54)

The last and seminal point, in Eckhart's words from one of his sermons,
reads:

All creatures are pure nothing. I do not say that they are a trifle
or they are anything: they are pure nothing. What has no being, is not.
All creatures have no being, for their being consists in the presence
of God. If God turned away for an instant from all creatures, they would
perish. (Walshe 1991, 1:284)

The same holds for their unity, truth and goodness. In the light of this
theory, it is obvious why Eckhart would want his listeners / readers to
"hate" every part of the soul that looks or clings to the "outside", the
world of finite existence: because that could only mean to cling to
something futile and meaningless. But how, if not by contradicting
himself, could Eckhart then be an academic and high level functionary
of the church? The explanation lies in the second statement on the unity
and convertibility of the transcendentalia, which is arguably a
consequence of the first: If God is being, unity, truth, and goodness, these notions in their true sense fuse with and permeate each other: being is one, true, and good, unity is, is true, and good, truth is, is one, and good, and goodness is, is one, and true. The confluence of these notions with each other reinforces the idea, already at work in their identification with god, that each one of them is more than a mere notion, it is a reality producing what it denotes. It also helps to understand why Eckhart would deny all being to the manifold individual creatures: if being is one, how can the manifold be, in and of itself? At his point, we can also see that Eckhart's mysticism is far from being irrational and obscure. It has a clear and precise logic of its own. And it is that logic which brings the mystic back into the world.

Let us go back to the notion of being. How come that, if true being is one, the manifold creatures exist? The "logical" reason for this is that being is identified with goodness. Goodness in medieval Christian philosophy may mean something close to "beneficience", understood in an ontological way. Already in Dionysos Areopagita, it is characterised by effluence, diffusion of itself. (Flasch 1986, 77) Eckhart follows this use of the term when he says in a sermon that goodness is the gate through which god "melts outwards". (Walshe 1991, 1:264) If being is inherently one, it follows that only one being can have true being. If being is inherently good, it follows that the one and true being flows out of itself, and gives itself to that which cannot be without receiving its being from somewhere else. If the one being truly gives itself to all being, it also gives its unity and wholeness to all being:

As god, who is totally being, is also simply one or the one, it follows that he immediately is wholly and totally with the whole individual being.

Through this process, being also realizes a higher form of unity, beyond simple uniformity:

Thirdly, and even better, I say that in fact from the one, that in itself is one, always immediately arises one. But this one is the whole universe, which arises from god, and in its many parts still is one, like god who produces it is one and a simple unity in being, knowing, and acting, but rich and manifold in respect to his ideas.

Going back from the universe to the more humble sphere of human life, we can see how Eckhart the mystic can arrive at a life of active

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1. Qua Deus est Deus, sive in Deo esse est, sive in Deo est esse, necesse est, ut Deus nobis sui esse trahat. (Eckhart 1936a, 173)
2. Tertio et melius dico quod re vera ab uno uniformiter se habente semper unum procedit immediate. Sed hoc unum est ipsum totum universum, quod a deo procedit, unum quidem in multis partibus universi, sicut deus ipse producens est unus sive unum simplex in esse, vivere et intellegere et operari, copiosius tamen secundum rationes immediate. (Eckhart 1936c, 195-196)
contribution without contradicting himself. In fact, one might say that, to Eckhart, the true believer will shun the usual modes of involvement with the world precisely in order to arrive at a better (or, in his own terms: the only true) way of beneficial practice. In accordance with his account of god as a being that is one, true, and good, the unity with god will mean unity with his goodness, with the abundance and ebullience of perfect being. Some of the sermons convey the urgent need to communicate, to share what one has and knows, that results from this. And in his comments on Maria and Martha, which praise the latter, who is actively working to support the fellowship of Jesus, over the former, who contemplatively listens to him, it becomes clear that Eckhart does not envision world-denial as the way to practice the dis-involvement with the particular. (Walshe 1991, 1:79-90) Quite to the contrary, the experienced practicioner proves his dedication to god via active service and work - and we can now say that this is not some external requirement Eckhart receives from tradition and supports as a faithful member of the church, but that it is a consequence of his own teaching on the very nature of being.

3) The Dharma-Body and symbolic expression: A note on Kūkai’s concept of ultimate reality as “implementation of features”

Mysticism is often described by its skeptical or even negative attitude towards language. The philosophy of Kūkai 空海 (774-835), founder of the Japanese Shingon school of esoteric Buddhism, gives a decisive counter-example. Kūkai most certainly is a mystic, who emphatically maintains the notion of a perfect reality, identified by him with the Great Sun Buddha, Buddha Mahavairocana (Dainichi nyorai 大日如来). However, by the same token, he also upholds that this perfect reality is not a self-contained and self-contented essence in a transcendent realm, beyond all words and signs. Instead, it permanently and pervasively communicates its very essence in all realms of sense experience. His explanation of perfect reality (jissō 実相) as the “implementation of features” in his philosophical treatises is most informative in this respect.

It is certainly possible to extract quotes from Kūkai’s writings in support of the claim that mysticism locates perfect reality and truth in a realm beyond language. For example, in his Sokushin jōbutsu gi 即身成仏義 (“The Meaning of Becoming Buddha in this very Existence”), Kūkai cites the following passage from the Mahāvairocana-sūtra (T. 18 N. 848, p. 22, l. b20-c01):

I (scil. Mahāvairocana, the Great Sun Buddha) am the origin of all. I am called the one on whom the world depends. My Dharma is incomparable.
I am primordial stillness, and no being is higher than me.

In his interpretation of the passage, Kūkai goes on to say:
The Dharma-Body of the Tathāgata and the original nature of sentient beings equally partake of this principle of original stillness.

In an isolated reading, such words might be understood in accord with the classic interpretation of mystical quietism: True reality is in a realm beyond words and actions, in pure stillness, which is also the true essence of human nature. But read in the context of Sokushin jōbutsu gi, which is the first of Kūkai's three treatises on the “three mysteries (or better: intimations) of actions, words, and intentions” (shin/ku/i no sanmitsu 身·口·意の三密), it becomes clear that the “stillness” he has in mind does not mean absence of actions, words, or thoughts. In the summary to his second treatise, Shōji jissō gi 声字実相義 (“The Meaning of Voice, Sign, and Reality / Implementation of Features”), Kūkai closely connects the “six / kinds of dust (objects)” (rokujin 六塵; material form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and concept ) with the expressive activity of the Dharma-Body:

The origin of the six kinds of dust are the three mysteries / intimations (sanmitsu 三密) of the Dharma Buddha (i.e. Vairocana). The three mysteries / intimations of equality pervade all the Dharma-Worlds and are always subsistent. What is called the reality / implementation of features (jissō) of voice and signs are the three intimations of the Dharma Buddha equality, and the mandala of the original being of sentient beings.

In the next section, which explains the terms used in the title, it becomes clear that this interpretation of ultimate reality (jissō) is emphatically meant to encompass all movements in the various Dharma worlds:

“If, on the inside or outside, wind and ki stir but a little, a sound will inevitably occur: This (fact) is called voice. The sound necessarily depends on the voice. The voice is the origin of the sound. If the voice is stirred, it is not in vain. Of necessity, it will express the name of something, and this (fact) I designate as sign. The name inevitably will call for its substance. This is called implementation...
If there was any doubt whether this take on jissō might not just be restricted to the production of language and the use of the human voice in the articulation of the famed mantra of Esoteric Buddhism, the stanza Kūkai coins to condense the teaching of this treatise makes clear it is truly meant in a universal sense:

All five elements have sound / The ten realms are provisioned with language / The six kinds of dust are signs / The Dharma-Body is the implementation of features.

Taken together, these quotations show that Kūkai takes the traditional term jissō, which might be understood to point towards a transcendent reality unblemished by the dust of the material and sensual worlds, and uses it to intimately tie the world of sensual-perceptual forms and the Dharma-Body together: The latter is identified with the fact that each event in the world of experiential objects is the articulation of the Buddha's teaching, which calls forth the realization of the Buddha's insight. Kūkai does not go on to explicate how this is related to "stillness", but one may infer from the passages quoted that "equality" is a key term here. Once the Buddhist practitioner has understood, and is able to perceive, the articulations and movements in the phenomenal worlds as intimations of the eternal Dharma-Body, he or she may find stillness in these movements, since they are essentially expositions of the one and unchanging perfect reality.

To sum up Kūkai's position, it is precisely through the articulation of signs that the true reality exists as such. And he makes it quite clear that his own work in writing and composing his treatises is part and parcel of this very process. It is a striking feature of these writings that they identify certain passages such as the stanza quoted above, which was composed by himself, as primary sources. They are subjected to the same kind of hermeneutical exposition that is dedicated to the Esoteric sūtras, i.e. in the understanding of Kūkai - the words of Buddha Vairocana himself. Thus, Kūkai not only theorizes on the identity of the Dharma Body and the articulation of signs, he also performatively exposes...
his faith in this teaching, and consequently, his own ability to aptly express the ultimate truth.

By way of a final note to this section, it should also be mentioned that this does not only hold for verbal articulation alone. If we remember that all events, and therefore also all actions, in Kūkai’s teaching are seen as signs, we can understand the many social, political, and cultural activities that have made him a legendary figure in the history of Japan as so many performative actualizations of his teaching. It is an irony of its own that due partly to the overwhelming success of his teaching, in the coming centuries Japanese Buddhism would no longer be the carrier of social and charitable activities that it had been in the Nara period. But it may also not be by chance alone that it was monks related to the Shingon school like Eison and Ninshō, who, in the early Kamakura period, revived this tradition of charity and social contribution.

4) Concluding remarks

In this paper, I have demonstrated by way of two eminent examples that the time-honored image of mysticism as a solitary, a-social, and quietistic teaching should be laid to rest. The fact that many mystics were socially active people is neither a happenstance, nor a contradiction to their teaching. Quite to the opposite, it is a consistent expression of their faith in a perfect reality. Quietism in this light appears as a mysticism stuck halfway through. The true mystics are those who will perform their belief in the identity with perfect reality through active contributions to the life of their community. Whether these contributions are beneficial in effect is entirely another question, and will, among others, depend on the way the identity of the actual with the ideal reality is interpreted. Mystics of all ages have chosen both paths: the one of identification with the present social order, which led them to associate with the powers that be in whatever schemes these were willing to involve them - or the one of denying the values of the day, and all association with the mighty, and living among the lowly, or even dedicating their life to the transformation of society towards a possibly more just future. If this proves anything, than it is that mysticism, its lofty rhetoric notwithstanding, is an entirely human affair, subject to theoretical and moral failure as much as any other cultural endeavor.
References cited


